aid materially in breaking Axis control of the 
Mediterranean and would prevent an Axis
move through West Africa. In this respect,
such a force would have unquestioned strategic
value. Plans for this operation are based on the
assumption that it will be executed  with the
approval of the local authorities. Our forces, 
however, must be prepared to face resistance
developed by Axis sympathizers among the 
local forces. In addition this operation  must take
place within the range of German long range
borbardments based in Spain. Our air support
during the initial phase of this operation will be
limited to two aircraft carriers. Our forces here,
when fully established, would still be incapable
of decisive action against Germany.
 
     Plans in this theater call for a combined U. S.
and British operation and the U. S.Units of this
force vdll be available for movmnent in the near future.
 
        Available shipping is the limiting factor which fixes 
the earliest date on which this operation could be
conducted.The initial elements of the U. S. Forces in 
this theater must be combat loaded and an insufficient
number of vessels suitable for this task are now in the
Atlantic.It is estimated that the earliest date on which
this shipping might be available is during July 1942
but we have no positive assurance that the situation
in the Pacific will permit this. Other shipping required
should become available  during the latter oart of
August or the 1st of September 1942 and could then
be furnished at the maximum rate that the port
facilities in Casablanca can accommodate.
 
        The "turn around" time to this port is much
shorter than to the Middle East and compares favorably
with the shipping time to England. it is estimated that
shipping time would permit deliveries at Casablanca at
about 3/4 of the rate to England. This advantage in
shipping time is offset to a considerable degree by the
limited port  facilities at Casablanca. The number of 
troops which can be debarked at a port is limited by
the capacity of the port to handle the supplies and
equipment which must accompany them. The 
port facilities at Casablanca will handle equipment
and supplies for about 2 Divisions per month, roughly
44,000 men. As the size of the force  ashore grows and
the shipping ratio of supplies to troops increases, the 
rate of 44,OO0 men per month will decrease.
        No reserve of Air power exists in the U. S. and the
Air Forces set up for this operation must of necessity 
be allotted from forces available to other theaters.