I am receiving almost daily a variety of military requirements
for 1943 and 1944. These come from the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission
and our Allies. The the most important of these requirements is the
percent of increase of the Army, there are others which affect our
production quite as much, if not more
 
       Furthermore, I believe that our production schemes in certain
respects, particarly concerning combat aircraft and escort vessels, are
probably too low and, therefore, need to be revised. I am enclosing a
separate memorandum to you on atrc~, which indicates my anxiety in
regard to this.
 
       what I should like to see is a fresh and realistic look at 1943
over-all requirements from a strategic point of view. This implies that
certain assumptions must be made on which elimated requirements for
United States forces of all types in the various probable theaters of
war, by number and general c~.position, are determined. It naturally
follows that these assumptions mast include Jud~aents as to the
strength of our Allies in 19~3 and the probable strength of our
enemies. The ability to transport and supply these forces overseas, of
course, is an essential factor in determining our requirements.
 
       Thiz review- and I do not imply a detailed ana!ysi~should be
made by you and A&~iral Kin.~ Jointly ~ your respective staffs.