-2-
 
                 Third: Paragraph third represents an attempt to obey
the direction for an immediate offensive in the face of a Russian
collapse not based upon the sound logistics of the original American
plan (Sledgehammer and Bolero), which for lack of British cooperation
has had to be discarded.
 
		Instead of being an actual offensive it states on its face that it is
the "definite acceptance of a defensive encircling line of action for
the continental European theater except as to air operations and
blockade".
 
		Upon the American forces it deliberately proposes the following
diversion in the face of an assumed victorious Germany:
 
                       	A. Isolated in the British Isles, a large
American force composed of our best combat troops deliberately trained
for offensive action, yet not large enough alone to assume such an
offensive in Europe and inhibited by lack of cooperation against such
an offensive.
 
                       B. In northwest Africa, a substantial American
force several hundred miles distant from its allies at Algiers. These
forces might conceivably be easily contained by relatively small German
forces advancing through the Iberian Peninsula and Spanish Morocco just
as 30,000 German troops under Rommel are now containing the entire
British forces in Egypt and Syria.
 
                              These U.S. and U.K. forces, even if
successfully landed and united, would be unable