which will best promote the adopted course. As I see affairs 
 
today, answers to the following broad questions will be most 
 
useful to the Navy:
 
              (A) Shall our principal military effort be directed 
 
toward hemisphere defense, and include chiefly those activities 
 
within the Western Hemisphere which contribute directly to 
 
security against attack in either or both oceans? An affirma-
 
tive answer would indicate that the United States, as seems 
 
now to be the hope of this country, would remain out of war 
 
unless pushed into it. If and when forced into war, the 
 
greater portion of our Fleet could remain for the time being 
 
in its threatening position in the Pacific, but no major effort 
 
would be exerted overseas either to the east or the west; the 
 
most that would be done for allies, besides providing material 
 
help, would be to send detachments to assist in their defense. 
 
It should be noted here that, were minor help to be given in 
 
one direction, public opinion might soon push us into giving 
 
it major support, as was the case in the World War.
 
              Under this plan, our influence upon the outcome of 
 
the European War would be small.
 
               (B) Shall we prepare for a full offensive against
 
Japan, premised on assistance from the British and Dutch forces 
 
in the Far East, and remain on the strict defensive in  the 
 
Atlantic? If this course is selected, we would be placing 
 
full trust in the British to hold their own indefinitely in
 
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