In reply refer to No. Op-16 NAVY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON 24 April 1940 Dear Dan: The word that a memorandum for the President as our estimate of the present situation did not reach John Magruder, and me until after working hours yesterday, so to catch this morning's air mail pouch, departing at ten, John is preparing his memormudum, Bode is preparing ours, and I am writing this general comment, on the Norwegian situation. To me there seems no indication of an early decision being arrived at, and whether or not the Allies will ever succeed in driving the Germans out of the 0slo region is highly problematical. The Germans, as is well knowm, made a surprise and simultaneous invasion of the principal Norwegian ports in a manner doing credit to their military efficiency. There are indications, however, that their losses of transports incident to this operation were so great that their landing forces were none too adequate. It is significant that they have not been able to push out more than about fifty miles from Oslo, nor that far from any other port, that they have not been able to link up between any two ports, and that they have not been able to take the fortress of Hegre, east of Trondheim. The difficult terrain, scarce and sloppy fly -ing fields, and interrupted communications (destroyed railroad bridges, etc.), are obstacles that will slow down both sides, but, in my opinion, favor the last comer. The Allies landed with commendable despatch, and have promptly effected contact with the Norwegians, including the area just north of Oslo, which I consider creditable. I believe the effect on neutrals made by the sudden and secret German invasion of Norway must, to a considerable extent, be cancelled by the prompt allied counter-action. Especially should that be so when one compares the price already paid to accomplish the situation in Norway as it now is. |