to Consul General Berry in Istanbul who would immediately communicate it to the State
Department in Washington.
 
          It should be noted in connection with the foregoing that several important political
developments occurred in the interval after the conversation between M. Balabanoff and Mr.
Kouyoumdjisky of 5 February and the arrival of the Secretary of State's message and that these
developments greatly confused the general situation. For example, the Finnish-Russian peace
negotiations did not progress rapidly, and the Italian campaign was obviously meeting with
difficulty, Marshal Tito declared himself in favor of a free and independent Macedonia and
negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey reported in the Press to be leading to Turkey's
entrance into the war broke down with the departure of the British Mission from Ankara. All of
these events could obviously color the judgment of Bulgaria as to the proper time for acting in
concert with the Allies. Moreover, certain Bulgarian officials delivered speeches on territorial
questions even though it had been made clear to M. Balabanoff that such questions were out of
order at that moment.
 
                           It is our judgment, however, that the Mission's primary objective has been
accomplished, namely, the establishment of direct contact with the Bulgarian Government, the
determination that in principle the Bulgarian Government desired to desert the Axis and the
provision of a channel through which arrangements could be made for the dispatch of a Bulgarian
Mission to Cairo to meet with British, American, and Russian delegates. We are of the opinion:
 
                           1. That the desire of the Bulgarian Govern-
ment to join the Allies is sincere.
 
          2. That action by Bulgaria in joining the Allies would be greatly accelerated if
Bulgaria could be assured that there was no disposition on the part of the Allies to destroy and
dismember her or to prevent the continuance of the present dynasty provided the Bulgarian people