The occurance of this incident, and the likelihood of its repition in other forms if the
Chinese leaders continue in their present course, raises the important question of the attitude
which the United States should adopt toward Sino-Soviet differences In a broader sense this
question involves our overall relations with both Russia and the present Chinese government.
     We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because the are bound to
effect our own plans in the same areaBut our relations with Russia in Asia are at present only a
subordinate part of our political and military relations with Russia in Europe in the overall United
Nations war effort and postwar settlement. we should make every effort to learn what the
Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful
firsthand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese Communists. But in
determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being in our hands. To
do otherwise be to let the tail wag the dog.
     As for the present Chinese government , it must be accknowldged that we are faced with a
regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in an active abnti-Soviet accelerating
economic collapse and increasing internal dissention, can only be characterized as reckless
adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious. But it
would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be ccontributing to Russian dominance in Eastern
Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too
weak to serve as a possible counterwieght to Russia . By doing so, Chiang may be digging his
own grave: not only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and
Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.
     Neither now, nor in the immediately forseeable future, does the United States want to find
itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed
dominance over a part or all of China.
     The best way to cause both of these possiblities to become realities is to give, in either fact
or appearance,