mean only the triumph of Communism and of the "Yellow Race|" Also, he has latterly qualified his
earlier public pronouncements: whereas a year ago he pledged a million Spanish soldiers to
defend Berlin against the Red Menace he declared six months ago that three million would defend
the Pyrenees, and most recently he has indicated a further strategic retreat by confining himself
to talk about police measures against Communism within Spain. And in the volume of his "memorable
addresses," which has just appeared, he has supressed those which most clearly aligned him with
Germany, even the one welcoming the last German Ambassador to Madrid, and has included the almost
pro-American speech he made when I presented my credentials to him last June.
As yet nobody in Spain seems disposed to precipitate a revolt against Franco or his regime
of Falange censorship and police. This is attributable in part to dissension araong the many
factions antagonistic to the Falange and critical of the Caudillo, and in part to widespread
belief that the latter is for the present, as he has beon in the past, the surest guarantee
against Spain's being involved by Germany in the war. It is gratitude for continuing peace which
explains whatever popularity Franco still enjoys; and this has certainly been enhanced by
Jordana's tenure of the Foreign Office and his obviously sincere efforts to pursue a practical
policy of neutrality and peace.
But as time goes on and the Axis is ejected from Tunisia and the incentive and ability of
the Germans to invade Spain disappear, the domestic situation here is bound to become acute. The
one service which Spaniards believe Franco is now rendering them -- that of staying out of the
war-can then be performed without his assistance. And with the removal of the external German
menace, all the latent internal opposition to the present regime, especially to the Falange
(which Franco has so ostentatiously fostered and featured), will emerge into the open and demand
a fundamental change.
Hence, the big question is not whether the present regime will endure but whether evolution
or revolution will put an end to it. If the monarchists, churchmen, army officers, and such
persons as Jordana and Gil Robles can pull together, they may succeed, with or (more probably)
without Franco's consent, incurbing and eventually abolishing the Falange, its censorship and
its police, and by effecting an