believes that Americans, in the sense that they are generally accepted in Italy, would be more   
welcome and would accomplish quicker and better results than if these efforts were in the hands   
of Italian-Americans. It might also be that Italians would expect more and demand more of   
Italian-Americans than they would of Americans of Anglo-Saxon stock.
 
     
 
 
May I make a further personal observation with respect to the ltalian fleet Which is the   
fourth largest fleet in being today. Whether it be true that the Italians have refused permission   
to the Germans to man the ships, or that the italians similarly had refused the demand of the   
Germans to engage the Allied fleet, or that the men of the fleet had threatened to mutiny rather   
than engage in battle, the fact remains that the greater part of the fleet is intact. That it   
would be of immense use to the Allies against the Japanese in the Pacific or replacing heavier   
armored ships of the Allies in continental waters for the use of the more suitable Allied ships   
in the Far East. Whether unconditional surrender would gain for the Allies the same advantages   
which a negotiated peace might produce raises the question what facilities, naval and military,   
could the Allies gain through a modified negotiation, and of what value would those facilities be   
in bringing about an end of the war both in the West and in the East. These are considerations   
which will affect the lives of thousands of men and the time when the war could be ended.
 
     
 
 
I have discussed the above several points with the Secretary of State in an informal way   
before dictating this memorandum, of which both the President and himself are receiving a copy.
 
Myron C. Taylor