doubts whether anything in the nature of the proposed Monetary Fund is
either likely to come off or to be of benefit to the world if it did. It
is after all based on the assumption that the maximum of international
trade is the main object and that parity of exchange is an important
contibutory factor in international trade and investment. But for
countries which base their policy, as most countries will in the future,
on stability of employment and production and consequently also on the
stability of the price level internally, it will be far more important to
be free to exercise complete control over exchange and investment that to
joy the minor convenience of international parity of exchang
In all these matters we here seem to be in a state of considerable
uncertainty. The Government has just issued a While Paper on Employment
which is based entirely on the principle that stability of employment
depends on the regulations and control of expeniture and investment. But
it only applies the principle with regard to domestic expenditure and
application to the control of imports or of foreign investments. I have
just come across an article in your New York Times which draws attention
to this lack of illogical coherence on our part and enclose a copy of it
in case you may not have seen it.
I see Mr. Cordell Haull has been raising the question of a world
organization to preserve peace, as indeed has Mr. Churchill. My oun
profound conviction is that so long as it is clearly understood that the
world organiation exists for conference and conciliation and, as such,
definitely excludes coercion from its purview, it may fulfil a very useful
function in creating a world opinion in favour of peace and in helping to
adjust many minor differences , which, if allowed to develop, might become
more serious. On the other hand, if the world organization professes,
again as such, to enforce peace, it will inevitably break down and by its
very existence paralyse the action of individual nations who might be
prepared to preserve peace. The Leauge of Nations played a very useful
part during the years between 1925, when we definitely rejected the Geneva
protacol, and 1935, when we committted outselves to the coercion of Italy
by sanctions. During those ten years British policy made it quite clear
that it did not believe in the use of sanctions and only regarded the
League as an instrument of conciliation. If that policy had been followed
it might have been quite easy for France and ourselves together quietly to
tell Italy that we could not allow her to swallow Abyssinia, and to arrive
at some reasonable