rising in Italy. it was a misfortune that the decisive action could take   
place only much too late for our country to benefit from it without   
passing through, to-day's tremendous experience. We had twice arranged the   
action which finally took place in July 1943; in May 1941, immediately   
following the criminal Greek campaign, and again in autumn 1942, at the   
time of the Allied landing in North Africa. The obstacles we had to   
overcome compelled us to desist both times. We were Mussolini's prisoners   
   just as the anti-Fascists he confined on the islands.    
 
                                                            
 
 
What we had tried at first was to foster an active movement in Parliament   
in order to bring about a constitutional crisis which would put the King   
in the necessity of taking action. But we came to the realization that   
it was impossible to act throuoh such large bodies as the Chamber and the   
Senate. The Grand Council was the only possible body, created as it had   
been by a law-introduced by Mussolini with the aim of limiting the   
influence of Parliament. But the law required that the meeting should be   
called by the Head of the Government who, conscious as he was of our   
opposition (Mussolini's and Hitler's speeches after September 8th, 1943,   
bear the full evidence of this fact) had always refused to let it meet   
since Deceraber 8th, 1939, when the Grand Council asked and endorsed, in   
its last sitting, a policy of full abstention from war at the side of   
Germany.  When he finally called a meeting for July 24th, he did so  
only to challenge us, and free himself once and for all of those who were   
           an obstinate obstacle to his policy.             
 
                                                            
 
 
Many stories have circulated about that meeting in  
the night of July 24th, but they are full of inexactitude and fantasy. I   
led the attack, and finally succeeded in bringing the Grand Council to   
approve a motion (See Annex I) which meant the end of dictatorship, and   
asked the King to avail himself of all powers conferred upon him by the   
Constitution.  My friends and I risked our lives (at the beginning of the   
ng our chances of success were scant indeed) in this last at
 
                                                            
 
 
On the same morning of July 25th, immediately after the meeting, and   
before knowing what the decision of the King would be, I stressed the   
urgency of asking an armistice to the Allies, offering myself to go to   
Madrid or Lisbon in order to approach the British and American   
authorities. I was convinced that not a single minute should be lost,  
so that Germany could have no time to take strong military measures. After   
two weeks I was allowed on my personal responsibility, to approach the   
British and American Ambassadors in Madrid. The difficulties in obtaining  
the visa from the Spanish Government, and the necessity of eluding the   
German surveillance (the Germans were after me since July 25th) account   
for further delay, so that when I arrived in Spain and Portugal (August   
18th), official contact between Allied and Italian military authorities   
had already been established. There was nothing I could do but to remain   
here, ready to do what might be required from me in  
-the service of my country, and of the common cause, at  
   long last uniting Italy to the Allies against Germany.   
 
                             In