There were many political elements who in October Would have  
accepted to work vrlth Maresciallo Badoglio so as to give a sense of  
unity to the Italian Government and a sense of unity to the new  
                       Italian Army.                        
 
                                                            
 
 
Although in these nine months Marshall Badoglio, for his own  
inclination and for polemic necessities got himself involved in  
reactionary and ex-fascist, pro-German circles, there were still  
many people ready to collaborate with him, believing his assertion  
that he was the best and only channel to collaborate with the Allies.  
The contacts between Rome and the south after June the 5th, made  
it appear ever more clear to the monarchists, that Badoglio's policy  
towards the House of Savoy had been frankly unfair, and it was proved  
that he tried by all means to estrange the Army's sympathy from the  
Crown Prince. The Price, on the other hand, having a personal knowledge  
of Bonomi's loyalty and capacity was very favorable to his choice, and  
above all witnesses on both sides, proved that Badoglio's diplomatic  
activity had the aim of claiming himself indispensable to the Allies  
and to Italy, more than to bring about clear and loyal relations between  
the two. So when the Committee of National Liberation was requested to  
form the new Cabinet it naturally chose its representative-id est Bonomi,  
without finding at Court, nor in the Army, nor in political pro-Allied  
  circles any staunch friend ready to stand for Badoglio.