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OFF~':SI~E A~TiON IN T~~ EURO~.': T~ATER
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: ~ : 13As0 : ~ I 190o0 , 7 : ~660o :,10o0 Lt.~rs {171}
:1000 Lt.~'s. (2S~)l~XX)Lt. $,S. (3~)
~300 P~'wuite z :, Pursuits
:2600 I 2~O : !~60 :1 Pursuits Groups j : 18000 : 7 :
2~2OO , 1~ : ~6800-:3000 Pursuits (~O0) :~00 Puts. (560}:3000 Pur~te
(10&O)
800 fJ~l~bq~s I , L It Transports ,,, :
LtO0 : ~C) : ",,~00, :: Tr~sport : 200 z -'- ': ~0 : - -
I - - : - - - ::SO0 Transports (&00) :800 Transports(~00) 800
Transports (~0}
11 TOTALS : f~67
I ~799 , 3s37 ;I TOTAT~ . : -'_-, %?~00I I ll~O
: ~.,18}800 ,:__m~3__ ~,es. ~1133) 16600 rlAnes.(1801)1__A600_
Fl--es. (2763)
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1DO0 Barges (~0 - 1OO men capacity) ~)O
Harps (Tank Lighters - cap~city 3 Tanks) ~ - CQR~ -
~TROT~S - AIRCRAFT CARP/EP~ - CAPITAL SHXP~.
-- (Co0~tFt~tiOn of gtab~ barges ~~t b~ u~dertaken
(Construction of suitebin barges rest be undertaken (Number
to be determined by study of ravel support and means availshis)
lmm~iatel~ b7 ~ritieh and U.S. )
i~ediatel~ by British and U.S. )
The forces ix~tcated above are ~:~prm::Le~t~,y 50 per
cent of the comet force6 nos available in the British Isles. It is
believed ~at these forces could be employed in the offensive operation
cost, plated, without
milit~lng agaimt the security of the British Isles.
Fr~ a lorg range viewpoint, the operations are expected to improve the
strategic position of the British u well is that of the Asoooiated
Posers. If the
United Nati~ are to win the ~r~ Brite~ and the U.S. ~t
conduct offensive operations in 19~2 that will definitely assist
Russia.
mm._~....~._._...~.~ .~.~~.._~_..~. ~ _ - - -
.~d,.m_ ....................................
1. ~ROJE~T'.~ ~F~SIVE OP'iPATIO,S IN ~-~P. OPE - P~T I, STP. AT~!3
3ONjID]~ATIO]:3. "'~' ;. ~-theother hand there is insufficient evidence
to conclude t.~at a deterioration,12. If the ene~ u,~ertakes
~uccessmlly the operations
........
within the Nazi political and military machines, .has created
condS:ions that are depicted in b., Russia would be removed as a
military
it
is believed that 19&2 is the critical year of the war. .'he
whole course of modern militating against the m. ilitary canabilities
of the Axis in ~-~rope. threat to th~ ~.ermans and the
Japanese for several years.
hiltsty may undergo radical changes as the result of events that
will transpire within
the next eight months.
i 2. In that period the war can be lost by the Axis Powers in t~e sense
that failure to
attain objectives ~ r,ean a prolonged struggle in ,~Xch the process
of attrition must
work inevitably toward German-Japanese defeat.
3. On the other hand Cermar~ may, during the course of the next
several months decisive-
l~.defeat the Russians and thus remove the final obstacle to the
attains nt of her
i~Bediate goal, namely, military security L~d a favorable economical
position. Moon-
! t~, oceans, seas and deserts w~uld then form effective nilStar7
barriers around
the Germaf~contr~lled areas an~ the conquest of the Ukraine, Doneta
and 3aucasus areas
w~d release abun~&nt supplies of oil, coal, wheat and manganese that
are so vital
to bar war eco~.
A. Japan is capable of consolidating her position in the southwest
Pacific by m~intain-
log strategically situated bases throughout the area to facilitate
the exploitation of
i~t eccetomic resources and interdict lines of communications
leading to and within
the area. With her position secure in the southwest Pacific, Japan
will then be a~le tc
launch a vigorous offensive against the Soviet with a view to
seizing the area east of
the Lake Baikal area. ..'his operation will urobably be coordinated
with the Carman
effort against Russia. If successful, the ;~ast rem~ining immediate
threat to the
Japanese Citadel woulo then be removed and Japan would be free to
establish & Japanese-
domimtted hegemony in the Far East.
5. The Axis PoKers, tncludif~ Japan, realize the industrial
potentials of the United
Nat~ &r~d recognize the strategic i~plic&tiona when their vast
resources are largely
diverted to the production of military supplies. They have, no doubt
concluded that
the United Nations would soon have the means to seize and maintain
the strategic
initiative. }having no illusions about the probable ~evelop~ent of
the situation, the
German and Japanese High Commands must vigorously exploit their
present military
superiority to attain the objectives mentioned above and thus
provide for the security
of their respective positions in the world, both economically and
militarily.
6. Despite the reported successes of the Red Arm~, the Russian
situation is still an
enigm, and &n accurate ev~uation of conilttone on that front is not
possible at
this time. Although Russia's strength was greatly underestimated b7
military authorities,
]~cluding the Ocrmass, a true test of Russia's capacity to resist
the ene~ will come
this sumer. THere is tangible evi:ence that the ~e."m~ns have been
denied maneuver
either by weather, Russian tactics, or a combination of both, an:[
the C~rman armies
have consequently been seeking a period of stabilization in that
theater.
8. There is still another important consideration that may strongly
influence the operations undertaken by ~,emma.-~y. Unless a successful
decision is reached Lq Russia during this year the Axis military and
economic positions will no~ only be materially weakened but the morale
of the Oarman people will be adversely affected. Even though initial
military gains are accomplished, the long-range futility of the war may
become apparent. The ~erman people will certainly become dispirited if
they are confronted with another winter in which ma-.h of their
territorial gai~s are again lost and thousands of lives and
incalculable amount of equipment destroyed.
They will realize that this sort of seesaw warfare will not liquidate
the Russians and will not bring the era of prosperity and peace so long
promised by the Nazi lea~ers.
9. Accepting the premise that the crux of '.he ~il~tary situation in
~.urope, perhaps in the entire world, is Russla, let us examine the
Axis capabilities with reference to that country. In general there are
two situmtions which may develop:
a..'he Germans may attest stabilization alo~6 the ~resent Russian
Front while execsting vlgor~us offensive operations again.-t the Me
literrane~n--"iddle ~ast. Ooncurrently the Japane.-e may push west
through india in order to effect a Junction with their European Allies.
b. The Oer~ans me7 make an all-out effort against the Russians in
~rder to destroy the Red armies, at least to render them militarily
impotent for four or five years, and to acAuire the vital economic
resources of the Ukraine-Jonets-~aucasus areas. Concurrently the
Japanese .~a7 attempt to stabilize the military situation in the
Southwest Pacific while exploiting the economic resources in that area;
and undertake the conquest of the Russian Maritime Provinces,
coordinate~ if possible ~th the ~erman effort in Europe.
10. Ener~ successes under the situation depicted in a., would prouab!y
precipitate the disintegration of BritaJo's far-flung empire by
effectively interdicting the lines of coomtmication between Australia,
:n~ia, the hi~lle -Ast, /gypt, South Africa and the British Isles. An
exchange of vital war supplies could be effected between the Axis
partners thus strengthening their economic positions. However
addltion~i-time will be made available to Russia during which she
should reconstitute her forces, expand her industries in the remote
Urals area an~ stren~hen materially her military position.
11. Also Japan's position would be dangerously over-extendei through
India with logistic problems probably beyond her capabilities and she
would not be exploiting her ~resent strategic freedom to secure her own
position militarily by seizin6 the Russian Maritime Provinces.
The Axis Powers would be in position, militarily and economically, to
consolidat~ their positions in ~urope and the Far Vast. Ample military,
forces would be released to extend Axis control through northwest
Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, the Mediterranean, Middle Fast, and to
effect the Junction with the Japanese in India. The Axi~ might
establish so effective a blockade around the British Isles as to compel
capitulation. Japan will also be in a strengthened military and
ecormmic position that will render her defeat extremely difficult and
costly in lives ~nd material.
13. If the above evaluations are reasonably sound, it is obvious that
the United Nations should bend every effm't to prevent the defeat of
Russia. The problem now presented is the determination of the most
effective and timely contribution the U.S. and ~reat Britain with their
available means can make, to insure that Russia is not defeated . this
year, l&. A careful analysis of the situation in~icates that the United
Nations can most effectively assist the Russians this year as follows:
a. Deliver the maxissue ~u~ntft~.es of appropriate
mun~tions to the Red arno.
b. Create a diversion of the maximum number of German
air and ground foro,s from the Russian front by launching as strong an
air and ground offensive as it i8 possible to form from Prittsh m~d
U.S. Forces available after all essenti~l strategic deployments in
other theaters are pr~vlded with the minimum forces consistent with
their missions.
FA~E I.
(See n~..~ sheet for Part II.)
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