ADMIRAL POUND then asked about Dakar. ADMIRAL TURNER stated that the
United States is getting up a plan for its occupation.
 
                 ADMIRALSTARK asked Marshal Dill if he agreed that Dakar could be taken by
direct attack. MARSHAL DILL stated that it could be done.
 
21.z BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM. -
 
                 ADMIRAL POUND then read a memorandum signed by the British Chiefs of Staff,
which was amended in minor points. (See Annex I for Revised Version). During the discussion,
the following points were brought out
 
MARSHAL DILL was asked what is the maximum estimated need in
United States troops for an offensive against Germany. The answer was 15 to 17 divisions in
1942, or early 1943, including armored divisions. ADMIRAL TURNER then stated that 45
divisions was the maximum which could be transported and supplied by available shipping in
sight.
 
                 ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the most mischievous naval operations which the
Germans could make at this time would be a mass surface and submarine attack on convoy routes
in the Atlantic. ADMIRAL STARK then stated that a most important target for the bombing
operations against Germany should be shipyards where submarines and airplane carriers are being
built. AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL agreed.
 
                 ADMIRAL POUND was given a copy of the American Naval building program. He
stated to General Marshall that the United States Army should look into the matter of putting a
force into North Africa if the British do under either of the following conditions:
 
a.    If invited by the French.
 
            B.    If Germany makes a move through the Iberian Peninsula.
 
In either case the attack should be a surprise.
 
       22.        BRITISH ESTIMATE OF ATTACK ON WEST COAST OF NORTH AMERICA.-
 
                 In response to a request from Admiral Stark, ADMIRAL POUND read to the
Conference a note which had been prepare by the Briiish Chiefs of Staff on the probable scale of
attack on the West Coast of North America.
 
                  In view of the short time which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had to study the
British Chiefs of Staff memorandum further discussion on it was deferred. (See Annex 2)
 
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