Northwest Africa. West Africa. Northeast Brazil and the Cape Verde Islands. Northern Ireland and Iceland. The occupation of the Canaries (by invitation), the Azores, and of Aruba and Curacao, fell into the category of minor operations. Further consideration would have to be given to the status of the Madagascar operation. It appeared that the British Chiefs of Staff understood that this report (see Annex 1), was accepted. However, the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that it was accepted in principle but should be restudied and resubmitted for further consideration. 2. NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT The British delegation was of the opinion that it would take German forces six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, and, without Spanish cooperation, a further six weeks to become firmly established in the South of Spain. It was pointed out that this estimate was based on the best information available to the British, and took account of the fact that the Germans at the present time hadno forces readily available to undertakethe operation. It was realized that with Spanish help the date of arrival in South Spain could be considerably accelerated. ADMIRAL TURNER explained that the Joint Planning Committee felt that only Casablanca should be used, in the first instance, as the minor ports were difficult to protect from submarine attack and effective anti-air protection could only be given to one port. He pointed out that the size of the North African expedition as envisaged by the Joint Planning Committee was greatly in excess of anything previously considered, and the implications on shipping were therefore enormous. Was this increase in size essential - particularly with regard to air? The British view was that the German Air Force was already stretched almost to its limit. It was decided th'at consideration of the size of the forces required should be deferred. It was also pointed out that one reason why large forces had to be envisaged was that the French authorities would in all probability only issue the invitation if the bait were, in their opinion, adequate. It was suggested that the French air force in North Africa might, in the early stages, prove of some value in spite of its known lack of spares, but GENERAL ARNOLD said that from a recent conversation he had had with a French officer who had recently left North Africa, he understood that only 40 of the French aircraft were capable of taking the air. -3- |