of forces .in that area .is insufficient to maintain that defensive position. After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct all all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive. 3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:- a. To hold the Malay Barrier, deffined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance. b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defense of India. c. To reestablish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison. d. To maintain .communications to Burma and Australia and to and within the Far East Area. e To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements. .FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS 4. The estimated strength of forces .initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached tables (Annexes I, II, and III) . Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard to the essential requirements of other theatres. RECOMMENDATI ONS 5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is soIved:- -- 2 -- |