Army General. George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff Brig. General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Brig. General D. D. Eisenhower, General Staff Corps Joint Secretaries Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M. Colonel E-. I. C. Jacob Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations Lt. Colonel P.M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 1. SUPER GYMNAST. - ADMIRAL POUND said that the British Chiefs of Staff had made a careful examination of the various factors which affected the timing of this operation, and the earliest date on which the first convoy could arrive at Casablanca. He explained these to the Conference and undertook to let the United States Chiefs of Staff have a note on the subject. So far as the British were concerned, it appeared that if January 7 were taken as the date on which planning really began, the earliest date for D-1 on which the decision to load the first convoy could be given would be February 4. In this event the first convoy would arrive at Algiers and Casablanca on D-28, that is, March 3, depending upon the availability of shipping on that date. He also pointedout that the whole undertaking would, depend upon the planning, the shipping, and the availability of troops and materiel. As to details at points of debarkation, ADMIRAL POUND said that he anticipated no difficulty in Algiers, and that in the British opinion, 29,000 men and 3,500 vehicles could be unloaded at Casablanca in the fortnight. GENERAL MARSHALL asked Admiral Pound if the British could undertake both Casablanca and Algiers. ADMIRAL POUND replied in the affirmative. GENERAL MAR SHALL then expressed some concern about the availability of shipping for the second convoy and undertook to confirm that January 7 could be accepted, from the American point of view, as the date on which planning began. -2- |