March 15, 1944.
 
My dear Chennault:-
 
                  I wish to goodness that communications were a little bit quicker. I did not get yours
of January twentysixth until March fourth, and many things have happened since then.
 
                  As you know, I had a hard time in pushing the British to improve the transportation of
oil, etc., from Calcutta up to the Assam bases, and I hope that their new promises will materialize.
Meanwhile, I understand that the total tonnage over the hump is going fairly well.
 
                   In regard to the B 29's, people here are very certain that this outfit should be under
Washington command and not solely in China. By command I mean overall location
determination but not operational work. When they are assigned to the Chinese area operational
command would be yours. The reason for this is that they want the right to move them to any part
of the Pacific theatre if and when the situation changes. I am inclined to think that once in China
they will stay and be kept up to strength because the production of B 29's' is coming on well.
Good luck to you and them!
 
                  I take it you are kept informed of plans for the whole Southwest Pacific area.
 
                   I agree with you about the importance, of the plan against shipping as a part of an
effective flank attack on Japan from China. Your figures of successful operations against Japanese
shipping are excellent.
 
                   You are the Doctor and I approve your treatment. Nevertheless, as a matter perhaps
of sentimentality, I have had a hope that we could get at least one bombing expedition against
Tokio before 'the second anniversary of Doolittle's flight. I really believe that the morale
effect would help!               .
 
          With my warm regards,
 
                              As ever yours,
 
Major General C. L. Chennault,
HEADQUARTERS, 14th U. S. AIR FORCE.