and relatively cheap, but is not a vital operation. To complete the whole program, so that most
intensive operations can begin in July, will take some months. Prompt action is therefore,
necessary if the proposed flank attack is to be made on Japan at the right time and with full effect.
On the other hand, I am not so self-assured as to suppose that you will even consider acting on
my recommendations alone, since a radical change in strategic planning in this area is necessary. I
most earnestly suggest, therefore, that you choose as your representatives some such able,
impartial men as Gen. Wedemeyer, and that you send them to China to re-survey the situation in
the light of the failure of the Burma campaign.
 
                    While the Burma campaign was the first item on the agenda, it seemed useless to
trouble you with my opinions. I write you now with a full sense of the gravity of the step I am
taking, and with the hope you will anderstand the motives which impel me to do so. So long as I
believe the actual length of the war to be at issue, I do not feel justified in withholding from you
the facts as I see them. If you accept my recommendations, but feel my job may be better done by
another man, I shall come home with some relief and with great gratitude to you for your faith in
my judgment.
 
          With kindest personal regards, I am,
 
               Most respectfully yours,
 
                    C.L. CHENNAULT
                    Major General, U.S.A. 
                    Commanding.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Encls: Copy  letter to Gen. Arnold
          Copy Plan of Air Operations in China.