TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO DR. T. V. S00NG DATED                  KUNMING, FEBRUARY 24th.
               'I have convey to Wellington Koo the following instructions:
              "I presume you have seen my farewell message to India. Please take this opportunity to
tell Churchill that I am personally shocked by the Indian military and political situation which are
in such a state that I could never conceive of before I arrived in India. I am afraid Churchill
himself does not know the real situation. It may be best to talk to Cripps first and for him to
inform Churchill.
              "I have tried to view the colonial problem most objectively. I could not but speak frankly
of what I thought. But I feel strongly that if the Indian political problem is not immediately and
urgently solved, the danger will be daily increasing. If the British Government should wait until
Japanese planes begin to bomb India and the Indian morale collapses, it would already be too late.
If the solution is postponed until after the Japanese armies enter India, then it will be certainly too
late. If the Japanese should know of the real situation and attack India, they would be
virtually unopposed.
 
      "If the political situation in India were to change for the better, this
may prevent the enemy from having any ambitions to enter India.
 
      "Please convey the above to Cripps. Also point out that, in my opinion,
if the British Government should voluntarily give the Indians real power and do
not allow different parties in India to cause confusion, the Indians would change
their attitude toward England, forget their hard feelings and become loyal to the
British Empire. Only such a policy could halt the Indian trend to part from the                                
British Empire and make it obvious that it is unpolitic and disadvantageous to                                
secede from the Empire."                                                                                     
            Please convey my views to the President. In a word the danger is extreme.
If the British Government does not fundamentally change their policy toward India,
it would be like presenting India to the enemy and inviting them to quickly occupy
India. When I think of it I am both worried and alarmed. Besides deluding themselves
and deluding the people with the belief that there is no immediate danger, there is no
realization that war is on and there is no determined spirit to fight. The defeat in
                         for  
Malaya was so rapid, probably/similar reasons, and as for military preparations, the
present Indian military preparedness is very much behind even of that the British had
in Malaya.'