1. PROBABILITY OF ATTACK.
 
 There are a number of most compelling reasons why, as soon as the
 
effort can be undertaken, an attack in force on Burma is to be expected.
 
To cut off China as a present fighting force and as a future base for
 
the Allies, to protect the flank against land and air attack, to operate
 
in the Indian Ocean, to seize oil, rice and lend-lease goods in Burma --
 
for these and other reasons, the Japs must attempt to occupy Burma.
 
There are probably from 3 to 4 Japanese divisions now in Thailand
 
and evidence is increasing that they are getting poised to strike through
 
the three invasion routes into Burma (See G-2 and Schnare dispatches).
 
2. Ability to Resist Attack.
 
Burma car~not be defended with present forces against an attack in
 
force. Ground troops number some 30,000-35,000 British, Indian gnd Burmese
 
troops (mostly Burmese) together with 3 regiments of Chinese, r~oreover,
 
these cannot be easily shifted from one sector to another. The Burma Railway 
 
is vulnerable. Equiptment appears to be meager, especially in the mechanized
 
and heavy ordnance branches. Fighter planes, both A.V.G. and R.A F.,
 
probably do not number over 50. There may be one squadron of bombers.
 
3. Possible Reinforcements, other than Chinese.
 
     Contrary to general impression, few troops would be available from
 
India to reinforce Burma. About 100,000 troops are in training in India,
 
but their equipment is inadequate and there would be resistance to sending all of them out of 
 
India. No forces can be spared from Australia and the
N.E.I. It is not known whether any equipment can be spared or whether