PARAPHRASE
 
 
       A telegram of May 20, 1942 from the American Ambassador at Chungking reads
substantially as follows:
 
        On May 19, speaking as government spokesman, T. F. Tsiang told newspapermen that
China' s immediate future is very grave, that the Japanese seem to be beginning an all-out effort to
dispose of China now, and that China needs all the assistance which her friends can send and that
such assistance must be sent with the greatest haste as otherwise the United Eations may find it
necessary to pay a double or threefold price for recovery in the future. Tsiang emphasized that
China needs bombers and pursuits, first and last, within the next three months. This was the first
official public expression of concern in regard to China' s present military situation.
 
        It must be admitted that the situation is fraught with serious possibilities. A decision to
undertake a major offensive in China may have been reached by the Japanese. However, so far,
the Embassy sees no sign of lack of determination on the part of the Chinese to meet the threat;
neither has there been an increase in influence of potential defeatist elements. There is an absence
of clarity in the military situation in Yunnan Province. Many factors exist which would seem to
rule out the likelihood of a major Japanese offensive in that province. These factors include
military logistics, weather, terrain, and what has seemed to be broad military policy and objective
on the part of the Japanese. On the other hand, that possibility must not be dismissed as the
Japanese have undertaken the unexpected frequently. The Embassy is of the opinion, however,
that the Chinese National Government will not disintegrate or collapse or that the Japanese will be
able to destroy it even if they should be successful in an invasion of Yunnan Province and should
advance on other fronts such as Chekiang - Hunan and in a northwesterly direction.
 
        The Ambassador recommends that if at all practicable increased American air support as
asked for by the Chinese should be given, not only because of the practical effect upon the course
of military operations against the Japanese, but also because of the psychological effect of such
aid from the United States upon theChinese Government and the Chinese people. We should give
the Chinese proof at an early date that China is looked upon as a vital theater of war by our
Government.