S E C R E T ENCLOSURE "A" OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 4. To prepare an analysis of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic ares. in 1943 and 1944, in con- formity with UNITED NATIONS strategy. ASSUMPTIONS 5. It is assumed that: a. CHINA will continue in the war against JAPAN. b. It is the intention of JAPAN to invade SIBERIA at a time advantageous to her and disadvantageous to RUSSIA, and before GERMANY is defeated. 6. After a thorough estimate of the situation for 1943-44 was made, it was concluded that in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST: a. The UNITED NATIONS should conduct limited offensive operations in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to keep CHINA in the war. b. For these purposes, UNITED STATES naval forces should be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum require- ments in the ATLANTIC, and with due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European AXIS, air and ground forces should be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of UNITED STATES naval forces. 7. J.C.S. 287/1 sets forth a strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN. Bssed on this strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN, the following courses of action are open to the UNITED NATIONS: - 3 - |