S E C R E T
 
     (4) Permit limited bombardment attacks on the mainland
       of JAPAN.
     (5) Make extensive preparations for the eventual
       operation of large air forces to be used in the air
       offensive against JAPAN proper.
     (6) Give support to Chinese ground forces.
       g. Air operations in and from CHINA are considered a vital
and necessary step in the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat
of JAPAN," J. C. S. 287/1.  The scale and tempo of the air
operations must be carefully gauged as they progress, in 
the light of probable Japanese reaction. If advanced too 
rapidly they might precipitate a large scale land offensive
by the Japanese in CHINA, at an earlier date than we consider
desirable.
      h. Following these limited operations, the large scale, 
sustained air offensive against JAPAN proper becomes feasible 
when supply routes to CHINA are developed to the point where 
the forces involved can be logistically maintained. This 
latter phase will undoubtedly require logistic support through 
a CHINA port in order that it may be conducted on the scale we
contemplate.
 
10. Operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA.
      a. After the recapture of BURMA, operations should be
initiated to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA. Such operations
will compel JAPAN to disperse her forces and will provide
an additional front in which Japanese forces may be engaged. 
These operations probably wilI extend from the RANGOON
area down the KRA PENINSULA towards SINGAPORE and to SUMATRA.
     b. The operations should be undertaken by British Common-
wealth Forces because the area is one of British strategic
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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