be borne in mind that, although there are many combinations that can be used to lift a combat team and its supporting elements, there is always one best method, and possibly a few other acceptable methods. The decision must be based on the tactical scheme of maneuver and detailed information on hydrographical conditions. 4. Some of the factors that determine the number of landing craft remaining after an operation and available for use elsewhere are: a. The loss rate. Little data exists upon which to base an estimate of any value. Operations against several types of defense such as strong or weak enemy air opposition (even types, of enemy aircraft have an influence), coast defenses, beach defenses, mines, underwater obstacles, and anti-boat guns must be conducted before estimates can be based upon valuable data. In this connection there is not even agreemerit on the loss rate for operational training as evidenced by planning for HUSKY wherein the plarmers estimated 20%, the Navy Department recommended about 5% the U. S. Army used 10%; as a compromise. Reports received 12 May 1943 indicate following training loss rates: LST LCI (L) LCT LCM(3) LCVP Camp Edwards, Nil Nil 16% 20% 33% (1) Mass. (U. S. Army Base) Amphibforlant For all types - 30% (2) (1) Reduced to 20% with experienced personnel. (2) Norfolk has less experienced personnel than Camp Edwards. b. Use for logistic support. Immediately after an amphibious attack, landIng craft are required to land supplies across the beach. The length of time landing craft of -4- |