US Version
b. If driven from Tunisia,
defend the "Island Line, re-
maining elsewhere on the de-
fensive as above; or
(2) To assume the defensive in
Russia and occupy the Iberian
Peninsula, whilst holding and
possibly trying to expand the
Tunisian bridgehead, remaining
strictly on the defensive else-
where; or
(3) To assume the defensive in
Russia and take the offensive
against Allied Forces in North
Africa through the Iberian
Peninsula, whilst holding and
trying to expand the Tunisian
bridgehead, remaining strictly
on the defensive elsewhere; or
(4) To assume the strategic
defensive on all fronts.
British
b. If driven from Tunisia,
defend the "Island Line, re-
maining elsewhere on the de-
fensive as above;
(2) To maintain the strategic
defensive on all fronts.
SPECIAL NOTE-
Unless Russia unexpectedly
collapses, an attempted occupa-
tion of the Iberian Peninsula
in 1943 would involve an in-
crease in Germany's total commit-
ments, and a depletion of her
forces in other theaters, to an
extent which would not be
acceptable to her. An attempt,
subsequently, to launch an
offensive against Allied forces
in North Africa is considered
even more remote. On the con-
trary, evidence tends to show
that, so far from contemplating
operations in the Iberian Penin-
sula this year, the Germans are
apprehensive of the Allies intentions
in that quarter.
PROBABLE GERMAN INTENTIONS AS OF APRIL 5, 1943
US
17. To intensify the war of
attrition against United Nations'
shipping and to seek to destroy
the Russian Armed Forces, assure-
ing the defensive on all other
fronts and retaining, as long as
possible, the Tunisian bridge-
head.
PROBABLE GERMAN INTENTIONS AS OF APRIL 5, 1943
British
17. To intensify the war of
attrition against United Nations'
shipping; to adopt an active de-
fensire strategy in Russia; so
far as possible by limited of-
fensire actions in Russia, to im-
prove her own position and,
should she unexpectedly attain
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