MATERIEL LOSSES
 
 
    Losses include both matdriel destroyed in battle and the considerable  percentage which must
be replaced under the hard conditions of active service.
    I. Best available reports seem to indicate that the German Air Force lost approximately 1,500
planes in the first two months of the Russian campaign. If subsequent losses have been
proportionate, then total losses in the first six months of war have probably been about 4,500
planes of all types. It is estimated that perhaps 10-15 %yo of this equipment could be made
serviceable through repairs it: will be noted that the monthly rate of loss appears to be less than
the monthly plane production rate, for all types; although a considerable additional loss has
undoubtedly been suffered due to accidental, break-downs, and other  non-combat causes.
    2. Estimates of loss of other types of equipment are not available. Military advice is to the
effect that materiel losses, from all causes, can be replaced from existing stocks and current
production. German losses have been mitigated, as well, by the fact that Germany has gained
control of most of the battle fields, and thus held a good i~a:'t of its own and Russian damaged
equipment.
    3. Total military petroleum consumption since the outbreak of the: Russian war is considered
to be in the neighborhood of 620,000 tons per month of which approximately 75,000 tons are
consumed by the air service. This rate of consumption involves some incursion into petroleum
stocks.
 
 
                                    OTHER FACTORS
 
Reflection on the fragmentary material available concerning German losses suggests that although
replacement of lost manpower and equipn tc~t has not presented serious difficulties to date, the
following considerations may be important:
    1. If German casualties are concentrated in the age group 21-33 (but particularly in the age
group 21-28), replacements of losses by soldiers drawn from the same age group may become
difficult, due