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     (9) Judgement as to the existence of a general manpower shortage in Germany is a matter of
definition. It is obvious that manpower resources under German control are not sufficient for the
maintenance of normal output for German civilians plus the requirements of the present war
effort. A more reasonable criterion would be the maintenance of the present war effort plus a
tolerable level of civilian output. There are evidences that this standard is becoming increasingly
difiicult to maintain in Germany, especially since the outbreak of the Russian war, despite the
exploitation of Continental manpower and other economic resources.
     It is, however, impossible to allocate exactly the extent to which a manpower shortage, as
opposed to shortages in transport, raw materials, and productive capacity, is responsible for
present strains. Specific evidences of manpower shortage, by this definition are the extraordinarily
long hours of work demanded of German labor; and tie extreme efforts-made to employ special
types of foreign labor; e.g., Polish miners, Belgian and Dutch engineers, etc. A general manpower
shortage, however, must be regarded as one of several over-all limits to German output, rather
than as a bottleneck capable, in itself, of precipitating crisis.
     10. Germany's most decisive and least manageable manpower problem is the shortage of men
suitable for active combat troops. Here foreign manpower can be used to a strictly limited extent,
and war prisoners are useless.
     Due to the great fall in the number of births in 1914-18, Germany has Only 2,244,000 men
between the ages of 23 and 28-about 1,500,000 fewer than if the pre-war birth rate had been
maintained. Even including those now 21 to 23, and those 28 to 33, there are only 7.2 million men
from 21 to 33, and this is the best age group for active combat.
     Losses from this group, undoubtedly heavy already, are virtually irreplaceable. This shortage
may prove serious in the face of protracted Russian resistance and may be decisive should the
manpower resources of hitherto noncombatant areas ever be fully mobilized against Germany.
 
 
 
 
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