15
 
     9. Allotincnts of phosphate fertilizers in 194-41 were about 40 percent of those in 1937-38.
Crop yields in Germany may be adversely affected if increased supplies do not become available
for next year's crops.
 
C. THE GERMAN MINERAL SUPPLY POSITION
 
    I. In the period 1933-39 Germany prepared for a major war by takin~ the foliowing types of
action with respect to minerals in
whictt her domestic supply was deficient:
(a) Large scale imports for stockpiling.
(b) Rigid controls and, later, restrictions on civilian consumption.
(c) The provision of facilities for the manufacture of substitutes on a large scale (notably oil).
(d) The substitution of abundant for scarce materials (notably the light metals and zinc for
copper).
    The German mineral position was materially strengthened as a result of the campaigns of 1940
by the acquisition of additional stocks and of new mineral resources.
    2. Deficiencies in certain commodities have, nevertheless, persisted, and the Russian campaign
has probably accentuated them, insofar as it calls for increased output in the aircraft and armament
industries. Excluding the steel-hardening alloys, examined below, the present position of the
German mineral supply may be summarizcd as follows:
    German Position Secure: Bauxite and magnesite, coal and lignite, iron ore, manganese
(assuming Nikopol mines available), zinc ore, lead ore, and mercury.
German Position Strained But Not Yet Critical: Copper, tin, antimony, phosphates, and coke.        
        3. A shortage in the steel hardening alloys has persisted, despite extreme efforts at
conservation and substitution. Wherever possible the alloys have been eliminated and the
percentages used, reduced. In general, molybdenum and, to a lesser extent, vanadium have been
substituted for the more scarce nickel and tungsten. A sum-