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D. THE GERMAN PETROLEUM POSITION
1. To ensure an adequate petroleum supply in case of a major war has been a prime
objective of Germany policy since 1933. Between 1933 and 1939 the following types of action
were pursued:
(a) Large stocks were accumulated from abroad.
(b)The domestic output of crude oil was sharply increased.
(c)Large plant facilities were provided for the manufacture of synthetic petroleum
products.
(d)Less essential uses were curtailed.
2. The acquisition through conquest of the prime oil producing areas of Europe has
probably constituted a net accretion to Germany's petroleum supply, although that accretion was
limited by the simultaneous acquisition of responsibility for satisfying the minimum petroleum
needs of Italy and the occupied areas.
Quantitative appraisals are subject to a wide margin of error, but the situation in the year
between the end of the campaign in the West and the beginning of the campaign in Russia appears
to have been roughly as follows:
(a) With the completion of the Western campaign in 1940 and with the Continent-wide
application of stringent economies, it would appear that the relation between consumption and
production was such as to permit at least a balance, at a level of 14-16 million tons annually, and
probably some accretion to military stocks.
(b) This relatively secure situation, however, depended not only upon widespread use of
substitute fuels and stringent economies but also upon the fact that the German armies were not
used actively and on a large scale in the year following June 1940.
(c) Within the rough equilibrium or surplus that appears to have existeel, there may have
been shortages of particular products, notably Diesel fuel and lubricants; and some surplus, under
existing economics, of certain types of gasoline. Some observers hold, however, that there is
almost complete flexibility as regards the proportion of particular products available to Germany,
provided the total basic petroleum supplies are adequate.