Telegram No. 932
From: Embassy, London
Sent: March 11, 1941, S p.m. Rec'd: 10:20 a.m.
 
PARAPHRASE
 
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
 
From Colonel Donovan for the Secretary of the Navy.
              I went to Ireland as you suggested in your communication. Factors are many and there is
no better narrative than in the communication dated February 7, 1941 to the Under Secretary of
State from our Minister, David Gray. The pressure of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland is
my idea the core of the situation at present. Through the medium of the Cardinal Primate of
Armagh pressure is imposed on de Valera. MaCrory is a determined,eloquent Nationalist and
vigorous man of 80 who relentlessly and openly repeats the litany of injuries and wrongs which
the Northern Irish Government he claims is causing the Catholic minority to suffer. In this
estimate I am sure I am right because I found that de Valera with me did not spend his time
explaining the history of the relations between England and Ireland as he did with others, I have
been told. On the contrary he and I came at once to the danger of invasion by Germany. De
Valera seemed worried and disturbed and yet anxious that I understand that in this cause he and
his government were friendly to England. He also stated that he was opposed and had been to the
elimination by force of the partition issue as he felt that only by evolution could they have unity.
He could resist invasion successfully and save England a diversion of troops if Ireland were
properly armed.
 
              The resistance of the people to any situation making available bases was referred to by
him again and again, to their distrust of the intentions of Britain which even so far extended as to
allow troops to land to resist known Nazi attack until actually the troops of Germany had come
in, and the determination of the Irish people to remain neutral even over America's request.
 
               In order that I should understand this he said he had requested the Cardinal to come
from the North and discuss matters with me. There is no need for me to state what I said to both
Of them but I do believe that there are dangerous elements which may have consequences of a
very serious nature to British defense if not dealt with. It is my opinion that they can be dealt with
if we and the British act rapidly.
 
              Mr. Churchill telephoned me when I returned and invited me to Checquers. Menzies,
who is the Prime Minister of Australia, was there. I expressed my belief to them that the center of
trouble lay in the North and that this trouble was emphasized by de Valera's failure to permit the
Irish people to be enlightened of what was taking place in the outside world, but I felt throughout
that he would wish to be in on Britain's side if he were free. I was asked to express my views as to
the remedy. I told them this was not a job of fighting but rather one of statesmanship: that the fear
of the Irish that the proper arming would not be permitted by the British as they intended