passion to invade the average Irish heart but,
  nevertheless, one the existence of which he vigorously
  maintains. I questioned him repeatedly as to the
  reason for this and as a rule he slipped easily and
  skillfully into a discussion of past history; but with
  some regularity I found him coming back to another
  reason which struck me as much more comprehensible
  end much more capable of being dealt with. That
  reason was that "Ireland is defenceless ." that "Dublin
  has practically no anti-aircraft guns," that "there
  is practically no air force," and that "the army is
  without modern equipment." In other words, I am
  quite sure that De Valera's neutrality policy is
  founded not only upon a traditional distrust of Great
  Britain, but also end perhaps principally upon fear
  of Gemnan attack, particularly from the air.
  
	(8)He recognises that the British people are not 
  likely to be willing; to provide arms which may conceivably 
  be used against them. He assorts that no possibility of
  such use will arise unless Eire is invaded by the
  British. This line of argument is, of course, well
  known, but I was left, after many repetitions, with
  a very definite feeling that, as this fear of attack
  is the principal obsession, the possibility of removing
  it by sent material asistance on the munition,
  and aircraft side should be promptly explored. It
  may be improbable, but it is certainly not imppossible
  that a country which wishes us to win should be willing
  to give us some assistance, provided we can reduce the
  risks involved in the giving of that assistance; and
  the right way to reduce those risks is to give the
  Irish weapons, not unconditionally, but as the price
  of co-operation.
 
  	(9)De Valera does not appreciate the immediate war 
  problem.  He stands in front of the map and cannot 
  understand why naval bases in Ireland should be of the 
  slightest importance to Great Britain. I found it necessary
  to explain to him the importance of air bases as a
  platform for fighting aircraft. He did not appear
  to have appreciated the immense sicnlficanece of even
  a hundred miles in the zone of operations of fighters.
  I think he would understand those things much better
  if he had some of his own. He told me with great
  earnestness that with arms Eire could protect herself
  and therefore protect Britain's flank was on the western 
  and north-western  approaches and that these could not be 
  protected by a neutral, but only belligerent ships and aircraft, 
  I had the impression that this platitude came to him almost 
  as a new idea
 
 	(10) He firmly believes that the United States is coming 
  into war, but has not yet faced, though I asked him to do so, 
  the effect which this would have on Irish American opinion.