August 24, 1942
 
 
Memorandum For Admiral King:
 
     I am recieving almost daily a variety of military 
requirements for 1943 and 1944. These come from the Army,
Navy, Maritime Commission and our Allies. While the most
important of these requirements is the proposed increase of
the Army, there are other which affect our production quite as much, 
if not more.
 
    Furtheremore, I believe that our production schedules in certain 
respects, particularly concerning combat aircraft and escort vessels,
 are probably too low and, therefore, need to be revised. I am enclosing
 a separate memorandum to you on aircraft, which indicates my anxiety
 in regard to this.
 
      What I should like to see is a fresh and realistic look at 1943 over-all
 requirements from a strategic point of view. This implies that certain
 assumptions must be made on which estimated requirements for United
 States forces of all types in the various probable theaters of war, by number
 and general composition, are determined. It naturally follows that these
 assumptions must include judgements as to the strength of our ability to 
transport and supply these forces overseas, of course, is an essential factor
 in determining our requirements.
 
    This review - and I do not imply a detailed analysis - should be made 
by you and General Marshall jointly and your respective staffs.