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          4. British and American material to Russia must be carried 
out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, 
preference must be given to combat material. This aid must 
continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be 
encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, 
which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on 
our part.
 
          5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investiage the 
possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would 
definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning 
point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of 
such grave importance that grave reasons are 
to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out 
preparations for it, that it be pushed, with utmost vigor, and 
that it be executed whether or not Russian xxxxxxxxx collapse 
becomes imminent. In the evens of probable Russian collapse, 
SLEDGHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. 
The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive 
diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.
 
          6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER
 is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving 
its intended purpose, inform me.
 
          7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the
picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it 
exists at that time.
 
          It is my present view of the world picture that:
 
          (a)  If Russia contains a large German force against 
                    her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for 
                    ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and prepa-
                    rations made for it.
 
          (b)  If Russia collapses and German air and ground 
          forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of 
          fulfillment in 1943.
 
          8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible 
whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into 
consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss 
means in series:
 
     (1)       Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
 
     (2)  Loss of Syria.
 
     (3)  Loss of Mosul oil wells.
 
     (4)  Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from 
     the north and west, together with access to all 
     Persian Gulf oil.