C. American shipping available for movement overseas
 of the U. S. troops will transport approximately 40% of the number
  involved by April 1, 1943. If this movement must depend entirely
  on available U. S. shipping, the date of initiating the invasion
  of France must be postponed until late summer 1945, by which time
  U. S. shipping can effect the overseas movement of the entire force.
 
          d. An accurate estimate of the availability early in
 1943 of all Allied shipping is being made by the CG, SOS. However,
 it is believed that when the movement of British reinforcements to
 theMiddle and Far East now projected for 1942 has been effected,
 and the situation in those areas stabilized, sufficient passenger
 transports can be made available for the movement of U.S. troops
 to England to meet the requirements of this plan. Additional cargo
 vessels will have to be diverted after January 1, 1943 to support
 this operation.
 
          e. Landing craft necessary for the operation is not available at present in sufficient
quantities to support the crosschannel movement. Provision for some 7,000 landing craft
considered essential for this operation has been initiated. However, only through intensification of
this construction program, immediately after agreement in principle has been reached, can this
number possibly be procured.
 
                       f. One of our current tasks is to send to Russia sufficient materiel aid to keep that
nation in the war as an active participant. Since the execution of the contemplated plan is not
feasible in 1942, other means of rendering assistance to Russia will have tobe undertaken.  This
definitely involved air support to the Middle East; although this is a British responsibility, our vital
interests are involved.
                           Development and construction of air fields, bases, cantonments, etc., in the
British Isles in preparation for invasion of Western Europe in 1943 must be substantially
completed in 1942.
 
          G. An advantage of this plan is that, while it is still in the preparatory stages, if the
German army should show signs of imminent collapse, an invasion of Western Europe can be
carried out on a limited scale.