WAR DEPATRMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON February 23, 19A2. In our conversation February 17th you brought up the question of moving troops directly to New Caledonia without the necessity of uniting them with their organizational equipment in Australia. I have had the matter investigated and submit the following: It is important that troops arriving in New Caledonia be prepared to fight, i.e., that they have most of their equipment at hand. Combat unit loading, each unit and its equipment on the same boat, was not possible. In this particular instance seven transports sailed from New York in a single convoy on January 23d, with 17,000 troops for New Caledonia and about 4,000 troops for Australia. The Maritime Commission was unable to f'urnish freighters for their heavy equipment on the east coast so that was sent out on nine vessels for the west coast, between February 12th and 21st, without naval escort. The troops are due in Australia February 26th, but the freight will not reach there until during the two-week period starting March 15th . To delay the troops while waiting for the freight would have meant delaying the arrival of the naval Borabora contingent in the same convoy and increasing the hazard for the convoy To send the freight directiv to New Caledonia would delayed the arrival of airplanes destined for Australia which of necessity had to be loaded on these freighters. Also it would have involved a complicated reloading problem in a port of limited facilities which might at any moment be attacked. The troops and their equipment first be assembled in Australia, prepared for a rapid disembarkation in New Caledonia, with the critical equipment first available. In brief, the voyage is being made to New Caledonia viaAustralia in order to utilize to the utmost the available capacity of shipping; this at a sacrifice of speed. I fear we will have to submit in part until the shippins program has developed to such an extent that cargo space is no longer the limiting factor. Chief of Staff. |