"They have also collected a large quantity of fast motor launches, both on the coast of Spain
and in the Canary Islands, as it is their plan to attack from Spanish Morocco and the French
Moroccan coast simultaneously. My source (A) mentioned above, told me only 2 days ago, there
were some 250 to 300 fast launches collected on the coast of Spain.
 
       "Once they were certain that the Americans were coming, they would start their drive with
the 3 motorized divisions which they believe to be sufficient to help overcome any French
resistance and follow up the drive and occupy the ground taken with lO Spanish divisions plus the
landing parties from the motor launches. They give themselves four days to accomplish their plan,
leaving them four to get ready for our troops".
 
       CONVOYS. Continued use of British Middle East shipping which provides a lift for
approximately 40,.000 men would probably meet transportation requirements in so far as
personnel is concerned without material effect on 1943 Bolero. Utilization of this transportation
prior to October, 1942, would seriously affect the flow of vital reinforcements to the Middle East
and India, now of greatly increased importance because of the reverses in Libya. The diversion of
sufficient cargo shipping from the U.K.-Middle East run to support this plan would reduce the
flow of supplies from the U.K. below the minimum required to maintain the forces now in the Y
iddle East. At the same time, the diversion of these cargo ships would result in the reduction of
British imports by approximately one-half million tons over the 6 months period involved.
 
       The U.S., by employing every available escort vessel in the Atlantic, could not establish a
new escort route without either serious effect on the movement of ships to the U.K. and
elsewhere in the Atlantic, or the transfer of escorting ships from the Pacific.
To make full use of port capacity two escort groups would be required constantly for at least six
months. Even by reducing shipments to the Middle East to bare maintenance requirements the
British could not furnish at most, more than one-half the necessary convoy protection. If,
however, they furnish full escort (2) it would require a heavy reduction in the North Atlantic
shipping. Due to lack of means British convoys to the Middle East and India do not receive the
escort protection provided troop convoys from the U.S. to the United Kingdom. The British
convoy methods are on an arc system; from the U.K. to Freetown; from Freetown to the Cape of
Good Hope; and from there to the Middle East. Naval escorts rarely leave their assigned areas,
meeting convoys by prearranged direction. In a recent case, a single British cruiser escorted a
convoy of 40,000 troops through the U.K.-Freetown arc. Such a method would be unacceptable
for the escort of American troops to Northwest Africa. In