Warsaw, October 6, 1938.
 
 
My dear Mr. President:
As pointed out in my cable of March 12, (forwarded
from Paris Embassy in my behalf by Mr. Wilson, a copy
of which is attached hereto) and on the following,
among other subsequent occasions (see my cable no. 179,
September 13, 8 P.M.; no. 190, Septenber 19, 12 noon,
paragraphs 5 and 6; no. 205, September 25, 3 A.M.,
paragraph 2) my observations had led me to feel (a)
that the Western European powers would not go to war
over an Austrian Anschluss, nor indeed, over Czechoslovakia,
and (b) that while in the latter case they night come
right up to the brink of war, Britain and France in the
final analysis might conceivably conclude that Czecho-
slovakia was not the issue over which the democracies
should go to war. I subsequently cabled in early September
(cable no. 179, September 13, 1938) that my observations
from here prompted me to feel we were in for a period
of "show-downs, back-downs, let-downs" and increased
tension. As it turned out, Europe avoided war this year
by the "skin of its teeth".
 
 
At this moment, European statesmen are re-examining
the positions of their respective states in the light
both of the far-reaching events of the past few weeks,
and of the potential implications of the Munich conference;
and are faced with the question: "After Munich, what?"
 
 
Although it has not yet become clear here whether
there exists a definite plan for carrying the Munich
ground work to a hoped-for fornula, looking to durable
European appeasement and pacification, I discern distinct
signs of renewed British efforts to "play ball" with
Mussolini. In fact, confidential reports reaching here
 
 
The President
 
The White House