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to say, they feel that recent events have shown that
the difference in strength between the major powers 
(particularly of Western Europe) and the lesser powers 
(especially in event of a combination anong certain 
of then) is not as marked as it was in the pre-war days. 
Indeed, according to my informants' opinion the Western 
European powers have shown they are not in a mood to 
fight. Subsequent analysis shows in effect they feel 
they have all to lose and nothing to gain. On the other
hand,however,the lesser powers who do not enjoy the same 
extent of economic and territorial contentment, have 
less to lose and more to gain. This my informants state 
is the mood in which most of the lesser states east of
Berlin are found today. Accordingly, the chances are 
more favorable for their resisting a German attempt to 
absorb them today than even before the recent crisis.
In fact, my informants feel that these lesser states 
would henceforth be more apt to come to each others 
assistance than hitherto.
 
 
Until tangible evidence of some practical formula 
which might serve to turn the Munich proceedings into a
factor for future appeasement and pacification emerges, 
statesmen in this part of Europe may be expected to regard
the current and near future period in the light of an
armed truce. Indeed, to my mind, if the statesmanship 
and diplomacy of Europe fail to conceive of a basis of 
a satisfactory readjustment and do not succeed in advancing
in rapid order a oractical formula looking to durable 
European pacification, I feel that we may expect a 
recrudescence of tension no later than the early days of March.
 
 
As for Poland's position at the moment, signs are 
becoming increasingly evident of Poland' s dissatisfaction 
over non-inclusion in the Munich conference (see my cables 
no. 139, November 24, 1937, paragraph 11; no. 53, April 
21, 10 A.M., Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph d; no. 53, April
21, 10 A.M., Section II, paragraph 6; my cable 
transmitted from London under date of March 8, 1938; and 
no. 54, April 22, 11 A.M., wherein I pointed out that 
one among other factors motivating Poland's earnest desire 
for inclusion in a conference looking to a three, four,
or more power pact, (especially in the event of German 
participation therein) is that Poland, aside from her 
non-aggression pact with Germany, is apprehensive over the 
fact that Germany has never declared her satisfaction
over