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made it clear that her participation in such a meeting would be made
contingent on (a) an innocuous authoritative interpretation of the
Franco-Soviet Pact, and (b) the absence from the conference of the
influence of Russia and of French satellites such as Czechoslovakia and
Poland.*
 
 
Second, the protraction of the Locarno preliminaries was probably
largely instrumental in calling forth the Belgian king's recent
statement of policy which placed particular stress on Belgian
neutrality and definitely asserted unwillingness to assume commitments
involving the guarantee of boundaries other than her own.  A force
which contributed further to Belgium's official attitude was the
unceasing influence of the Rexist movement in that country.  This
movement shares many National Socialist tenets, particularly in regard
to anti-Bolshevism, and there are material indications that there is
more than theoretical interest in it on the part of Nazi Germany.  The
new position thus created by Belgium was a most important gain for
Germany, not only morally but, as has been estimated by competent
military authorities, it was equivalent to the additional strength
provided by fifteen army corps.  France, by the same token,
suffered a corresponding loss, thus effectively terminating her claim
to hegemony- which presumably did
 
 
 
* Embassy telegrams No. 299 of October 9th, and No. 305 of October 17,
1936. 
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