Sir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Viscount Halifax
(Received September 20, 10.40 a.m.)
No. 349 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45!
Washington, September 20, 1938, 2.30 a.m.
1. The President telephoned to me himself this afternoon to
call on him at the White House in the evening, and I had a long
conversation.
He emphasized the necessity of absolute secrecy. Nobody must
know I had seen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview.
I gathered not even the State Department,
2. He said the Anglo-French note to Czechoslovak Government1
was the most terrible remorseless sacrifice that had even been
demanded of a State. It would provoke a highly unfavorable reaction
in America. He himself was not disposed to blame the French or
British Governments whose difficulties he completely understood.
He spoke in a most friendly and appreciative manner of the Prime
Minister's policy and efforts for peace. If the policy now embarked
on proved successful he would be the first to cheer. He would
like to do or say something to help it but was at a loss to know
what. He had no illusions as to the effect in Europe of his previous
public statements. Today he would not dare to express approval
of the recommendations put to the Czecholoslovak Government.
He would be afraid to express disapproval of German aggression
lest it might encourage Czechoslovakia to vein resistance. He
thus felt unable to do anything and thought at his press conference
tomorrow (he has postponed the last two) he Would confine himself
to refusing to make any comment at all.
3. As to the immediate future the first possible case he would
deal with was that Czechoslovak Government should acquiesce,
but that he regarded as virtually impossible. They would fight
and his general staff told him they would be overrun in three
weeks. Hungary and Poland would join in the pillage. And even
if Czechoslovakia did acquiesce in the demands made, would Germany
res %t there? Had Herr Hitler given any pledges to the Prime Minister
as to the future? He was sure that other demands would follow
elsewhere: Denmark, the Corridor or most likely of all a dangerous
and forcible economic or physical penetration through Roma
4. The second case that he examined was that the present policy
failing the Western Powers would find themselves at war with
Germany and probably Italy sooner or later, but as he thought
sooner. In this case, in his opinion, even if Great Britain and
France and Russia were fighting loyally together they would be
beaten if they tried to wage war on classical lines of attack.
They would suffer terrific causalities and would never get t
5. He therefore came to the third case. This is the very secret
part of his communication and it must not be known to anyone
that he has even breathed a suggestion. If it transpired he would
most be impeached and the suggestion would be hopelessly pre
1. See Volume II of this Series, No. 937.