WAR DEPARTMENT
                  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
                           WASHINGTON
 
 
                                        January 9, 1942
 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
 
     Subject: North Africa.
 
     The accompanying report, proposing an operation 
against North Africa, by occupying the Madeira Islands and 
Tangier, and landing a large force at Casablanca, has been 
given careful consideration.
 
     This operation, if successful, would have im-
portant and far-reaching results. Control of North Africa 
would protect the South Atlantic sea lanes and air routes, 
and would prevent the extension of Axis influence to the 
West and South. However, the operations envisaged have im-
portant disadvantages.
 
     A landing in the Madeiras will undoubtedly be 
opposed, by the Spanish.-Also it would sacrifice the import-
ant element of surprise in a landing on the mainland. If 
the Madeiras are occupied, the use of these islands as a 
base for operations against the mainland will be subject to 
interruption since they are within easy bombing range of 
Spanish and Axis aviation based on the Canaries and on the
mainland.
 
     Tangier is now occupied by the Spanish and a land-
ing there would probably be opposed. For the defense of 
Tangier, in addition to the local Spanish garrison, Franco 
has about 150,000 troops in Spanish Morocco which can be 
used to reinforce the initial defensive troops. Furthermore, 
Tangier is highly vulnerable to air attack from bases on the 
Iberian Peninsula as well as in North Africa.
 
     The occupation of Tangier would probably precipi-
tate the embroiling of the large Spanish forces in this area. 
The delay caused the Allies by Spanish resistance would pre-
vent surprise and would enable the Axis to support the Spanish.
 
     The assistance to be expected from the natives of 
North Africa and the opportunist French mentioned in the at-
tached paper is, of course, problematical. The dominating