- 23 -
 
him from the air; and that this same spirit which shows itself
 
in Partisan conversation as boastfmlness is probably no small
 
part of the spirit which, in their most hopeless moments, en-
 
abled them to continue their resistance and somehow survive.
 
     L. OVER-.ALL ESTIMATE OF PARITISAN 
                       MILITARY SITUATION
 
It seems unlikely and practically impossible that the Par-
 
tisans are in a position to accomplish any of the following three
 
military objectives:
 
(1) Drive the enemy from their country.
 
(2) Prevent the enemy from withdrawing from their country.
 
(3) Annihilate the enemy from within their country.
 
The Partisans are in a position to harry the enemy at many points
 
and to influence the enemy situation by making it more difficult
 
for him to do the things he wants to do --more difficult to en-
 
joy bhe material resources within the country, more difficult to
 
move troops and supplies around within the country, more difficult-
 
to maintain troop strength and morale since enemy troops
 
are being frequently killed and wounded albeit in small numbers. It is doubtless true also that the 
 
presence ands strength of the Partisans necessarily increases both the ememy expectation of an 
 
Allied invasion and his fear of the consequences of such an invasion. The previously outlined 
 
limitations on Partisan activities against the enemy could only be removed by (1) the Par-