b. To seize vital inland communications and important 
facilities near AJACCIO with parachute troops.
 
     c. To conduct amphibious and land operations in the follow-
ing sequence:
 
               Phase I: To land forces in the GOLFE DE SAGONE under 
     air cover from SARDINIA in order to seize the port and air-
     field at AJACCI0.
 
               Phase II: To land follow-up forces at AJACCI0, and 
establish land-based aviation on the airfield.
                              To advance overland to the east coast.
 
                                    To land forces south of BASTIA, under air 
     cover from AJACCI0.
 
                                    To advance upon smd seize BASTIA.
 
          Phase III: To occupy the remainder of the island.
 
     d. To consolidate the island against counterattack by air 
or sea.
 
33. Geographic Estimate.
 
          a. CORSICA is a rugged and poorly developed island, possess-
ing few good harbors and limited communications. The terrain 
is unsuitable for operation of armored forces. The island is 
115 miles north to south, 50 miles east to west.
 
     b. From BASTIA, extending south for sixty miles, there is
a narrow coastal plain, fringed by beach sad interrupted by 
lagoons and marshes. Elsewhere the coast is rocky, although 
very small beaches exist in most of the coves and around the 
river mouths.
 
          c. The local populations, though not particularly pro-
united nations, are definitely anti-Italian, and provide fruit-
ful ground for subversive activities to support an assault.
     
     d. AJACCI0 and BASTIA are the only town, of importance.
 
    
                                                                             Appendix "B"
 
 
                                                   - 19 -
 
FE~ ! 9 1974