39. Advisability of the operation.
 
     a. Advantages.
 
         The operation continues the engagement of AXIS land and 
air forces in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN.
 
                Provides an essential protective base for future am-
phibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE, and thereby forces 
GERMANY to reinforce her NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN defenses 
to counter the threat.
 
                Denies to the AXIS a base for aerial interference with 
UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA.
 
     b. Disadvantages.
                The ability of the AXIS to utilize CORSICA as a base
to hinder UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA can be sufficiently 
neutralized by aerial operations. Occupation of the island 
is not required, therefore, for this purpose.
                Garrison requirements to secure the island are extremely 
heavy compared with the benefits accruing from the occupation. 
Contrarily the AXIS will be relieved of the necessity of main-
taining a large garrison on the island.
 
     c. Conclusions.
 
         The operations is warranted only if:
          It becomes evident that, through reinforcement, the 
AXIS Corsican strength will be sufficient to interfere 
seriously with UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA; or
                The UNITED NATIONS expect to eventually assault am-
phibiously SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY.
 
 
 
                                                              Appendix "B"
 
 
 
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