ENCLOSURE "A"
 
      OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION 
                                 OF THE DODECANESE
 
    5. Statement of the problem.
          To prepare an outline plan for the seizure and occupation 
of the DODECANESE.
 
    6. Assumptions.
     a. HUSKY is successfully completed by mid-August, 1943. 
     b. The bomber offensive against AXIS installations on the 
    continent is increasing in intensity and will seriously reduce 
    the AXIS war potential.
 
     c. GERMANY'S operations against RUSSIA in 1943 will not be 
    decisive, and RUSSIA will remain an important factor in the
    war.
 
     d. A cross-channel operation will not be feasible in 1943 
    unless the Military power of GERMANY has disintegrated 
    appreciably.
 
     e. An invasion of the BRITISH ISLES or of TURKEY is not 
    considered an AXIS capability. An AXIS invasion of the 
    IBERIAN PENINSULA is improbable. SPAIN, PORTUGAL, and 
    TURKEY remain neutral.
 
     f. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its 
    shipping implications.
 
     g. UNITED NATIONS Commitments in the PACIFIC and Asiatic 
    areas and to RUSSIA remain substantially as now planned.
 
    7. Mission of the operation.
 
          To seize and occupy the DODECANESE, in order to provide 
    bases for further operations against the BALKANS or CRETE.
 
    8. Concept of the operation. (See Map, Appendix "A")
          An amphibious operation, two-thirds in ship-to-shore, trans-
    portation, one-third in shore-to-shore transportation, launched 
    from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of cap-
    turing the DODECANESE.
 
 
                               
 
 
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