b. Ground.
          1 Airborne Division; 10 Infantry Divisions. 
 
     c. Naval.
          4 BB, 6 CV, 22 CA & CL, 85 DD.
 
4. Conclusions.
     The capture of the DODECANESE and CRETE would be an expen-
sive operation, involving as it does an assault on the DODECANESE 
out of the effective tactical range of land-based fighter air-
craft. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and
GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be
commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of 
the BAIRNS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY thus 
eliminating the necessity for an operation against the DODECANESE and 
CRETE.
 
    The possibilities of a simultaneous assault on the 
DODECAMESE and CRETE were examined. It was found that the 
capture of CRETE and the DODECANESE by a single operation would 
be nothing more than a simultaneous execution of the separate 
plans for the capture of these two positions. Furthermore, a 
simultaneous operation would sacrifice the advantages to be 
gained by having previously acquired bases in the DODECANESE 
from which land-based fighter protection could be provided for
the assault on CRETE.
 
 
 
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