(8) Is a step toward opening the AEGEAN. b. Disadvantages. (1) Necessitates a difficu1t amphibious operation against the DODECANESE out of effective tactical range of land-based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft. (2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition. (3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY. (4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian front. c. Pertinent remarks. The capture of the DODECANESE and CRETE would be an expensive operation, involving as it does an assault on the DODECANESE out of the effective tactical range of land- based fighter aircraft. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted From SICILY thus eliminating the necessity for an operation against the DODECANESE and CRETE. The possibilities of a simultaneous assault on the DODECANESE and CRETE were examined. It was found that the capture of CRETE and the DODECANESE by a single operation would be nothing more than a simultaneous execution of the separate plans for the capture of these two positions. Furthermore, a simultaneous operation would sacrifice the advantages to be gained by having previously acquired bases in the DODECANESE from which land-based fighter protection could be provided for the assault on CRETE. - 12 - |