4. Conclusions. a. Advantages. (1) The operation continues pressure on the AXIS in the MEDITERRANEAN region, thereby decreasing AXIS forces avail- able for deployment in RUSSIA or in western EUROPE. (2) It provides advanced bases, bringing the PLOESTI oil fields and DANUBE RIVER traffic within effective heavy bomber range. (3) It can be accomplished by UNITED NATIONS forces in the MEDITERRANEAN area. (4) It contributes directly toward the elimination of the Italian Navy as a factor in the MEDITERRANEAN. (5) Successful accomplishment will stiffen Spanish neutrality and will be an added factor to induce TURKEY to join the UNITED NATIONS. (6) It establishes a base for further operations against AXIS forces in the Balkans. (7) It offers an opportunity for active assistance to guerillas in YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE. b. Disadvantages. (1) The initial landing cannot be supported by land- based fighters. (2) Support by carrier aircraft brings the carriers within effective range of enemy shore-based aircraft and motor torpedo boats, and exposes them to submarine attack. (3) The Heel cannot in itself be regarded as a major bridgehead for teentry into the Continent. (4) The AXIS reaction to the operation may be an advance through SPAIN. (5) The lodgement will depend on vulnerable lines of communication. c. Advisability of the operation. The operation should be undertaken only if the use of aircraft carriers is feasible and if the collapse of Italy is imminent. - 2 - |