4. The forces required and comments on availability are 
indicated below:
        
        a. Air: 424 U. S. combat aircraft - can be made available 
by diverting 1 heavy (35 airplanes) and 1 medium (57 airplanes) 
bomber groups from north AFRICA after HUSKY.
            576 British combat aircraft - a deficiency of 90 heavy 
bombers and 120 fighters must be met.
 
        b. Ground: 13 Chinese divisions, 7 British divisions and
6 assault brigades- available but equipment needed for 2 
assault brigades.
 
        c. Naval: 4 BB, 3 CV, 6 ACV, 4 CA, 6 CL, 5 CL (AA), 57
DD, 30 DE and 10 AMS - DMS - British can provide all but
1 CV, 2 CA, 5 CL (AA), 30 DD and 27 DE.
 
    5. Degree of meeting required objectives
 
    This operation will engage Japanese forces in both UPPER 
and LOWER BURMA, will establish an air base system in BURMA 
for a coordinated air offensive, and secure a lodgement at 
BASSEIN, second largest Burmese port, from which exploitation 
may be continued in the succeeding dry season to secure complete 
control of the IRRAWADY supply routes into north BURMA. While 
this operation would "maintain pressure on Japan" and "retain 
the initiative in the area," the flow of supplies to CHINA would 
be limited to the capacity of the route through INDIA and north 
BURMA. However, by the capture of RANGOON and the opening of 
the IRRAWADY in the succeeding dry season campaign, the large 
capacity of the routes north from RANGOON would be made available.
 
    6. Conclusions
     a. The operation as outlined can be conducted in the 1943-
44 dry season.
            b. Its accomplishment can be effected only if a decision is
made without delay, and a maximum of force and effort applied
to surmounting logistical and other difficulties.
 
 
 
 
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